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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THAD L. HATCH, et al
CONNIE LIETZ, et al
JAMES P. XENAKIS, et al
Plaiintiff s and Appellants

vs.
GARRETT FREIGHT LINES, INC., a
corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case Nos.
7974
7975
7976
Consolidated
for Trial

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF·
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case arose out of a collision which occurred on
U. S. Highway 91 about 5 :30 A. M. on October 19, 1951
on a long curve a few miles south of Kanosh, Millard
County, Utah. Defendant Garrett Freight Lines, Inc.
was driving and operating its tractor and semi trailer
south. The north bound car was a 1951 model green
Studebaker in which was riding Captain James P.
Xenakis, Connie Lietz, her daughter Joanne Lietz, Captain Herbert Sheldon Neeshan and his son Robert
Neeshan.
Captain Xenakis, Mrs. Lietz and her child had driven
·from Phoenix to Las Vegas where they picked up Captain Neeshan and his son and were traveling to Salt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Lake to go deer hunting. They had been driving all
night. The last known stop prior to the collision was at
St. George, where Captain N eeshan (according to Mrs.
Lietz' statement to the investigating officers) had taken
over the wheel. Except for this statement there is no
proof as to who was driving the Studebaker.
All occupants of the Studebaker were instantly
killed except Mrs. Lietz who was asleep in the rear seat.
The five actions were filed, four alleged death claims
and the personal injury claim of Mrs. Lietz. All were
consolidated for jury trial before the Honorable A. H.
Ellett.
DEFENDANT'S THEORY
Defendant's evidence, based on the testimony of eye
witnesses and the physical facts described by the investigating officers, showed that the Studebaker as it
approached and came into the curve was traveling about
80 miles per hour. Its right wheels traveled along the
right gravel shoulder about 200 feet when it suddenly
swerved out of control and directly across the highway
into violent collision with the defendant's tractor on
defendant's right hand side at a point which eye witnesses estimate to have been three or four feet from the
shoulder.
PLAINTIF'F'S' THEORY
Plaintiffs' theory was that the defendant's truck was
driven onto the wrong side of the highway just prior to
the collision, causing a collision between the two vehicles
while the Studebaker was well within its right hand or
proper lane of traffic.
2
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ISSUE AS TO LIABILITY
To show the agreed issues it has been necessary to
supplement the Record on appeal to include the pretrial and hearing on defendant's Motion for Sumnmry
J udgn1ent before the trial judge, Honorable A. H. Ellett,
on December 27, 1952 (R. 859-69). The Motion F'or 'Summary Judgment was based on affidavits and depositions
of eye witnesses, which showed that the collision occurred
well on defendant's side near its right shoulder. Plaintiffs presented nothing to the contrary. The court pointed
out that the Motion was not controverted and that plaintiffs would have to indicate in what respect there would
be any issue or issues for the court or jury to try, to
which counsel responded:
"Mr. Schoenhals: It happened on my side of
the highway, Your Honor." (R. 868)
Plaintiffs' counsel then proceeded to comment on
the matter of brakes, claiming that if defendant's brakes
were defective it would tend to pull the tractor onto the
wrong side. To this the court said and counsel answered:
"THE COURT: That goes to the wrong side.
"Mr. Schoenhals: Yes." (R. 868)
No further claim was made by Plaintiffs' and it
was agreed in open court that the question of liability
would first be determined in the form of a special verdict
(R. 361).
SPECIAL VERDICTS
The following special verdicts were submitted and
unanimously anslWered by the jurors as follows:
"Question No. 1. Do you find by a prepon-

3
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derance of the evidence in this case that the tractor or the Studebaker, or either of them, was
negligently driven to the left of the center of the
highway immediately preceding the collision
involved in this lawsuit~
"Answer ('Yes or No') Yes
"Question No. 2. If your answer to Question
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No. 1 · is 'Yes', name the vehicles which you so
found was negligently driven across the center of
the highway.
"Answer: Studebaker" (R. 219)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
It would be impossible to agree with Appellants'
Statement Of Facts, which consists essentially of self
serving conclusions contrary to the actual physical evidence and testimony of eye witnesses. We will, therefore,
undertake to set forth the facts as developed by both
parties.
EYE WITNESSES
There were dis-interested eye witnesses, residents of
Kaysville, who were going deer hunting, namely Hal
Noyes, James Faile and Roy Talbot, riding in a 1949
Ford pickup truck which was following defendant's rig.
Roy Talbot, riding in the center of the front seat, was
asleep when the collision occurred but Noyes and Faile
both observed the collision.
HAL NoYES

Hal Noyes, who was riding on the right hand side
of the pickup, testified: That they had followed the Garrett truck from Fillmore through Kanosh and were
4
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traveling about 150 to :250 feet behind defendant's truck
(R. 373--1). It was just as dawn was breaking (R. 743).
He observed the Studebaker automobile before the
collision and saw the impact (R. 734). He saw two
bodies come through the windshie_ld of the Studebaker
(R. 7-10). He Inarked an ".X" on Exhibit 1 showing the
approximate place of impact just north of the point
between the ~Iobile Gas sign and the forked fence post
near defendant's right hand shoulder (R. 737). He said
the point of impact was not more .than four feet from
defendant's right shoulder (R. 738).
With respect to the Studebaker, he testified he saw
it from the time it came over a hill on the long stretch
approaching the curve, traveling at least 80 miles per
hour (R. 739).
He testified defendant's truck was traveling e~&
tremely close to his right shoulder and observed the
driver turn his lights to "low beam" (R. 736-7). Defendant's tractor and trailer did not make any change in its
course of travel except
"Immediately before the impact, just a matter
of, well, almost too short a time to mention, the
truck driver did steer his wheels to the left to
avoid the i1npact."
Thereafter the truck continued on across the highway
after the impact (R. 743-4). He estimated his own speed
and that of defendant's tractor as between 35 and 40
miles per hour (R. 738).
He and his companions after stopping on the right
hand side immediately got out to assist the injured (R.
5
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740). Among other things they kicked the debris to the
side so that cars coming from both directions could go
between the rear of the trailer and the seats of the Studebaker (R. 741). He did not know any of the people
involved in the accident.
JAMES FAILE

James F·aile, driver of the pickup, testified: That
he was following about 200 to 250 feet behind defendant's
rig at about 35 miles per hour. He saw the Studebaker
quite a ways up the road before the impact and observed
its spot light blink on and off (R. 780). The Studebaker
was traveling 70 to 80 miles per hour.

I

I:.

I,

r
I

"He (the Studebaker) came down and just
before it got to the truck it swerved across" and
"came off the side" as he, Faile, was trying to
stop. At the time the Studebaker collided with it,
defendant's truck "was traveling close to the edge
of the oil on the right hand side" (R. 781). He
(defendant's driver) turned just a little to the
left; "looked like he was trying to miss ... "
He, Faile, carne to a stop on the right hand side about
50 feet back of defendant's trailer (R. 782). He assisted
in putting out flares and some of the debris was moved
so traffic could get through ( R. 782-3).
LAREN SoMSEN

Laren Somsen, defendant's driver, testified that he
resides in Murray; that he had been driving for the
Garrett Freight Lines since 1944 and was still employed
in the same capacity (R. 531). While so employed his
regular run was from Salt Lake City to Cedar City.
6
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He left Salt Lake City on October 19, the day of the
accident, about 1~ :30 A. l\L He stopped at Fillmore
about 5:00 A. ~I. (R. 532) and made the usual check of
his equipment (R. 533). He passed through Kanosh.
In approaching the curve he said:
"I was traveling on my side of the road and
as I approached this curve you could see the lights
of a car coming off the hill * * *. As I went into
the curve I dimmed my headlights. * * * As I
got most of the way through the curve, these
lights appeared. * * * Coming towards n1e off the
hill. That is the lights coming from the Studebaker traveling north on the highway (R. 534).
The lights suddenly took off toward the wrong
side of the highway toward me. * * * Naturally
I hit the brakes. I swore, I think I jerked the
steering wheel at the same time, but it was all
over that fast. I was hit at the same time. It was
all simultaneous. I was thrown against the steering wheel. * * * It jarred me enough that my
foot came off the brake, I grabbed the hand valve
and set the brakes on the trailer and brought the
outfit to a stop. * * * Until he swerved toward
me, I was traveling approximately two or three
feet from the center of the road." (Possible two
or three feet from the west edge of the hard surface (R.. 535).)
He explained that as the Studebaker approached the
curve the driver was using the spot light which blinked
on and off (R. 549). The spot light went off when the
car (Studebaker) went out of control (R.543). It
appeared to him that the Studebaker approached between
80 and 90 miles per hour (R. 537) and was about 100
feet away when it went out of control across the highway
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(R. 537, 573). He said:
"He was right on his side of the road when
he went out of control. * * * He shot across the
highway and then his lights straightened up
towards me and that is all." (R. 5:18)
Prior to the accident he had occasion to use his
brakes frequently and they were in good working order
(R. 531). l-Ie made the usual check of his equipment at
Fillmore about 5:00A.M. (R. 533). The load was 56,000
to 57,000 pounds ( R. 543).
He and Sheriff Culbert Robinson appear in Exhibit
"F", a picture where they are p()inting to marks made
by the Studebaker crossing the highway (R. 539). 'rhese
fresh marks were traced from where they commenced on
the east or southeast shoulder of the highway to where
they shot across the highway, thernafter leaving the
highway where it (the Studebaker) spun around. They
also traced and observed the marks of defendant's truck
(R. 539, 540).
By stipulation the tachograph was received in eYidence showing the speed of the defendant's tractor at
approximately 37 miles per hour (R. 544). It wnt'
explained that the tachograph records the stops and the
speed of the tractor (R. 545).
PHYSICAL EviDENCE

The accident was investigated the morning it happened by Sheriff Culbert Robinson of Millard ('ounty,
Highway Patrolman Eldon C. Sherwood of Nephi a.nd
Patrolman Stanley White. Pictures were taken by Lamar
Brunson of Fillmore (about 9:00 A. M., R. 609) under

8
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Exhibit F - Looking North
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Exhibit N- Looking North
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':hibit 1

the direction of and at the request of Sheriff Hobinson
(R. 60-!). These pictures show the tire marks of the two
vehicles and their danmged condition and the general
scene of the accident.
At the trial counsel for plaintiffs used huge enlargement of these photographs (see Exhibit A-F) and encumbered the Record with so many photographs, reprints,
drawings, charts and other exhibits as to niake it difficult, if not impossible, to follow the Record. To assist
the reader, therefore, we have herein reproduced a few
of the pertinent eo,.xhibits, including the map prepared
by W. Y. Tipton showing the curve.
CuLBERT RoBINSON

Culbert Robinson, Sheriff of Millard County, testified that he had been sheriff of the county for ten years
and he received a phone call around a quarter to six and
immediately left Fillmore to go to the scene of the accident, 16 miles (R. 588). After attending to the injured
and making sure there were flag1nen (R. 589) he made an
examination for brake n1arks of both vehicles, Exhibit
B (R. 590). When he first arrived at the scene it was
light enough to clearly see the marks (R. 609). He was
assisted in the investigation and taking of measurements
by Highway Patrolman Stanley White and Eldon Sherwood.
He traced the tire marks of both cars. On Exhibit
B he placed a small ''X" on the two tire marks of the
~tudebaker leading into the debris (R. 591-2).
With reference to Exhibit N, another picture taken
~~~, 1\fr. Brunson (R. 592), Sheriff Robinson is shown
·9
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pointing to the Studebaker n1arks crossing the highway
and beyond on the opposite side ).Ir. Son1sen is pointing
with another baton where Robinson had him point from
where these tire marks could be followed "through to
where it came to rest." He could also follow these tire
marks back the other direction south along the shoulder
(R. 579) for an overall distance of 328 feet, that is, the
entire distance along the shoulder and across the highway and into the debris (R. 597, 601). With reference
to these marks, and in particular with reference to the
marks crossing the highway shown in Exhibit F, he said
the mark was that of a "tire mark" as distinguished from
a "brake mark" and said
"There were markings of the tread on the
highway that showed the markings were the same
as on the side of the tire." (Studebaker) (R. 601).
He was present when Mr. Tipton made his measurements
and prepared the map (R. 619).
These marks he drew for illustrative purposes along
the shoulder and across the highway as shown on Exhibit
16 (R. 599, 600-1).
He was unable to find any north bound tire marks
on defendant's left hand side or the east side of the highway (as testified to by plaintiffs' witnesses Bowman,
Middleton and Staples, R. 593).
STANLEY WHITE

Highway Patrollnan \Vhite received a call just prior
to 8:00 A ..M. He first went to the hospital at Fillmore
(R. 621). There he conferred with Dr. Freeman and
saw the injured. He then proceeded to the scene and with

10
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Sheriff Robinson n1ade a prelin1inary investigation
stepping off the distances (R. 622). Upon arrival of
Patrolman Sherwood they recorded the measurements
with a tape. They took the measurements from a point
designated as the '"erescent" (see Exhibit 12) near the
point of impact on the northwest side of the road. They
measured the marks of the Studebaker which were traceable, conrmencing from the south on the east gravel
shoulder 3:28 feet south of the accident (R. 624). This tire
mark was followed ~00 feet along the east shoulder where
it left the shoulder, crossing the hard surface portion of
the highway at an angle (R. 625) (Exhibit F') and then
into the debris on the opposite side (R. 636). He described the right wheel mark along the shoulder and to
a point until after it crossed the center of the highway as
being darker and more distinct. Thereafter, as the marks
turned, then the opposite side or the left tire marks leading into the debris were the darker (R. 625-6, Exhibit B).
It was roughly one-third of the total distance of 328
feet (or approximately 109 feet) from the crescent or
approximate point of impact to where the Studebaker
marks left the shoulder to cross the hard surface, swerving into the debris on the opposite side (R. 636). They
traced the wobbley flat tire marks from the approximate
place of impact through to the right front tire of defendant's tractor. It was blown out at the time of in1pact
(see Exhibits "B" and 12).
Other measurements were made, it being 39 feet
from the crescent to the rear of the defendant's tractor
(H. G22), 60 feet from the crescent to the engine of the
11
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Studebaker which from the force of the i1npact was
throlwn into the field to the northwest ( R. 628), 12 feet
from the "crescent" to the Studebaker which crune to
rest west of the highway (R. 633) and 7 feet from the
center of the highway to the "crescent" or gouge mark
(see Exhibit 12, R. 635-6).
He said there were no other wavey or irregular tire
marks other than that of the flat tire (R. 631) and he
was unable to find any tire marks of any north bound
vehicles such as those described by witnesses Bowman
et al. There were "no other marks on the highway" (R.
628).
CRESCENT

The only explanation of the "crescent" or "gouge"
mark, vaguely shown in the form of an arc (Exhibit 12)
well on defendant's side of the highway was the testimony
of Sam Taylor, who made an inspection of the mark and
the Studebaker and found that the width of the "crescent"
and the rim of the Studebaker both measured appr~~
mately five inches. He also found that the left front rim
of the Studebaker where the tire was flattened and torn
loose (see Exhibit "D") was bent on both the outside
and inside lip (R. 669-70-71). This was the only evidence
of the actual cause of the "crescent", from which point
the measurements of the investigating officers were
made.
ELDON

c.

SHERWOOD

Eldon C. Sherwood, a highway patrolman from
Nephi, similarly identified the wobbley flat tire marks
in Exhibit "B" which he could clearl)' trace from the area
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of the wreckage to the right front flat tire of the defendant's truck (H. 641-:2). He also said that he exrunined
for tire marks in the defendant's left hand lane or the
area where :Jlr. Bowman et al claimed to have seen tire
marks of the Studebaker and explained that there were
no such tire marks in that vicinity (R. 644-5).
'Yhen ~Ir. Sherwood was asked to describe the tire
marks leading along the shoulder and across the highway, l\lr. Schoenhals injected objections on the ground
that the testimony would be repetitious and that the
photographs spoke for themselves. Thereupon it was
stipulated at the suggestion of the court that officer
Sherwood would testify in regard to such tire marks and
the physical evidence the same as officer White and
Sheriff Robins on ( R. 640).

PLAINTIF'F'S' THEORY
Plaintiffs' theory was clearly demonstrated by a
drawing, Exhibit "GG" prepared before trial showing a
collision entirely on defendant's left or wrong side of
the highway. Plaintiffs' Exhibits "BB" and "CC" were
also used to illustrate the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses. For convenience we have reproduced these
exhibits herein to illustrate the testimony. (Ex. 66-BBCC)
As proof that the collision occurred in the east lane
Appellants claimed there were north bound tire marks of
the Studebaker in the east lane intersecting the tractor
marks. To establish these marks they called Harry T.
Bowman, a friend and former co-worker of Captain
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Xenakis who was killed in the accident (R. 315), and
James A. Middleton and Harold and Grant Staples,
who later went with Bowman to the scene.
HARoLD T. BowMAN
Harold T. BoWinan testified he went alone to the
scene of the accident about 4:30 or 4:45 P. M. the day
it occurred. He didn't ~-x;amine it thoroughly that day
(R. 271, 274). He made two visits the following day,
October 20th, and a fourth visit the day after, October
21st. On the later visits he took Harold and Grant
Staples and apparently :Mr. Middleton (R. 316, 332).
On his visit the second day, October 20th, there had
been traffic over the particular area. It wasn't the same
(R. 276). On that day, the 20th, he examined them (R.
285). He said there was a faint set of tire marks east of
the center of the road (R. 286) which stopped just before
they got to the cross marks of the tractor.
"They just came to that point and there were no
more marks" (R. 287). They just disappeared. He
couldn't trace them any further (R. 313). He said these
marks were tiwo feet east of the center of the highway
(R. 296) and on Exhibit BB marked two blue lines to
illustrate their location (R. 303).
He observed another set of tire marks (identified by
the investigating officers as the Studebaker mark~)
approaching from the south and crossing the highway as
shown in Exhibit F, which he marked in red on Exhibit
BB. He said the first mentioned marks appeared wider
than the others crossing the highway ( R. 290, 304). He
didn't measure or use a tape and all measuremen b WPI'<'
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only approximations ( R. 316). He said he couldn't be
accurate when he was "guessing" (R. 317). He had no
personal knowledge that any of the marks were made
by the Studebaker involved in the accident (R. 334).
He identified three small parts of the Studebaker
(Exhibits U, Y and \Y) which he said he found on the
east shoulder (R. 294).
On the day following the accident he also claimed
to have observed some zig zag marks, about the approximate length of the tractor back frmn the so-called point
of impact on the east side (R. 273, 279, 280, 282-3) where
again he made no measurements but guessed (R. 300).
He denied seeing any wavey or zig zag marks made
by defendant's right front flat tire.
JAMES

A.

MIDDLETON

James A. Middleton, a student from the B. Y. U. at
Provo, was deer hunting. He couldn't remember the day
but believed it was October 21st (R. 340). He testified:
"Well, Mr. Bowman and I walked out where
we saw one track and it * * * looked like pretty
old track." (R. 344) "He stood in the middle of
the road and these lines, I imagine made by an
automobile, were about two feet on that (east)
side of the road." (R. 346)
He made a similar drawing as Bowman, marked
Exhibit CC, showing the alleged Studebaker marks on
the east side and the other north bound tire marks (identified by the investigating officers as the Studebaker
marks) crossing the highway which he marked 6 and 7
on the same Exhibit (R. 346-7-8).
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When asked by Mr. Schoenhals about zig zag marks
from the tires of defendant's tractor, he said
"It is quite hard to say because we were just
walking out there." (R. 343)
He had never discussed the matter with Mr. Bowman or Mr. Schoenhals, he had just met Schoenhals that
day (R. 3'53).
HAROLD STAPLES

Harold Staples similarly testified to accompanying
Mr. Bowman on October 20th seeing "some faint marks
up in front of the truck" on the south or southeast side
(R. 358). He acknowledged seeing another set that
curved across the highway and undertook by way of
estimate (R. 419) to say that the former were narrower
than the latter ( R. 358-9-60) .
GRANT STAPLES

Grant Staples likewise went with Bowman the day
after the accident. He did not make any measurements
and his testimony was admittedly cumulative of Bowman's (R. 529).
To bolster his theory counsel for Appellants.
attempted to prove that the marks crossing the highway
and proceeding across and through the debris were not
caused by the Studebaker but by a Mercury that
approached from the south and applied its brakes after
the accident. Counsel had adroitly taken an· affidavit
dated November 4, 1951 (about two weeks after the accident) from James Faile, written in his, counsel's, handwriting and later supplemented with two type'_Vritten
affidavits both dated December 1::1, 1952 (all contained
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in Exhibit 1-±). He even went further and attached
affidavits of Faile bearing the san1e date, Decmnber 13th,
to the photographs marked Exhibits "00" and "PP".
These affidavits, five in all, were calculated to show that
the Studebaker marks, as identified by the investigating
officers, were those of the Mercury.
Counsel for appellants did not call Faile as a witness nor use any of the affidavits or :B'aile's testimony as
direct proof, but secretly concealed them as a surprise
to impeach Faile.
Faile's testimony and a court reporter's statement
taken before Cecil Tucker in Ogden on January 22, 1952
(see Exhibit 13) show that Faile was undoubtedly mis-.
taken if not mislead with respect to the matter contained
in the affidavits.
On direct examination Faile testified that the Mercury when it approached did not stop far enough north
to get into the debris (R. 784). On cross examination by
counsel for plaintiffs he acknowledged that he had signed
the affidavits in Mr. Schoenhals' office in the presence
of Schoenhals and Andreasen, where the typewritten
forms had already been prepared (R. 792). He further
testified that the morning of the accident he hadn't paid
much attention to the marks and explained that he had
previously identified the Mercury tire marks south of
the accident as shown by the circle in Exhibit "H" (R.
797-8). With reference to the court reporter's statement
taken January 22nd, he had similarly shown that the
:Mercury stopped south of the accident and debris (R.
798-01).
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From the court reporter's statement (Exhibit 13)
it was clear that Faile had no knowledge such as that
contained in the affidavits. He was there questioned
with respect to Erllibit "F" as follows:
"Q. He is pointing to a mark across the
highway, and a gentleman further back in the
picture pointing to the line near the shoulder, did
you examine the tire 1narks there~
"A.

No I didn't.

"Q. You wouldn't know whether they were
caused by the Studebaker or not.

"A. No I wouldn't know whether they were
on it or not, I didn't pay attention to that.

* *
"Q. On exhibit F, I think you said about the
tire marks there that you didn't scrutinize the
highway close enough or examine that close
enough to know what marks exactly were there.
:j(:

"A. No. The only ones I did pay any partie-·
ular attention to is the one where the guy in the
Mercury turned completely around in the road.

"Q. Was that south of the place shown in
exhibit F~
"A.

Yes.

"Q. There were other tire marks further
down, a little ways~
"A. Yes, the one the Mercury made was further south of these."

RoY TALBOT
Roy Talbot testified that when the Mercury approached he was standing 50 to 75 feet south of the
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wreckage flagging traffic, that is south of the rear end
of defendant's tractor and the debris (R. 806, 810). That
the Mercury stopped about 15 to 20 feet south of him
(R. 810), which would make a total distance of 65 to 90
feet south of the accident that the Mercury stopped.
Noyes testified that at that time he was standing
right by the seats of the Studebaker keeping passing
cars from coming too close to the bodies. The Mercury
approached from the south (R. 742) and was traveling
fast and applied its brakes. He further testified that it
stopped a safe ·distance south of him. With reference to
Exhibit "B" he pointed out that it stopped at a .place on
the highway south of the passenger automobile shown
in such exhibit and that the Mercury at no time came
into or near the debris involved in the accident (R. 743).
HoRACE CLARK

Horace Clark testified he drove his 1951 Mercury
north approaching the scene of the accident about 5 :30
A. M. That he brought his Mercury to a stop on the
right hand side short of defendant's truck. He did not
drive into the debris (R. 811-813).
BRAKES

In bringing the matter of brakes before the court it
appears that counsel for Appellants has greatly e~ag
gerated this matter.
Appellants' counsel was furnished with all of the
service records of the tractor and trailer units and the
only fault that he could find was that on September 24,
1951 the right rear brake drum of the tractor was relined
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and that the instructions in the book directed that both
ends of the axle should be relined at the srune time. It
must be remembered that on the tractor trailer unit
there are sixteen wheels with brakes, four axles in all,
and if there had been any uneven braking power in one
axle it could only have a very minimal effect on the unit
as a whole.
It was shown through Theo Soden, defendant's shop
foreman at Pocatello, that since publication of the service record in question an improved make of cam hau
come into operation so that irregardless of the amount
of wear on any particular brake lining the amount of
air pressure would be equal in each wheel (R. 766, 7, 8).
With the use of the new cam on the unit it would be
impossible for one of the wheels to lock (R. 769, 70).
It also appears from the tractor service record and
the testimony of Mr. Soden that all of the brakes were
inspected and adjusted on October lOth and October 17th
and were in good working order, the latter date being
just two days before the accident (R. 770, 1).
Mr. Soden, after observing the photographs, also
explained that the tire marks made by the tractors and
trailer were nonnal and did not indicate a bad brake
condition (R. 771). He explained that the maximum
braking efficiency occurs just before the wheels start
to slide or burn rubber (R. 771), and that the tractor
and trailer turning at the angle they did and on the
slope in question would nor1nally throw its weight onto
the right hand side which would force rotation of the
right wheels for a longer period than the wheel~ on tJw
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left hand side, which accounts for the darker Inarks on
the left side as shown in the photographs (R. 77'2). Under
these circmustances the wheels on the right could be performing just as Inuch braking function as the ones on
the left (R. 772).
Laren Somson testified that he used his brakes
throughout the trip and that they were in good working
order.
Expert witnesses were used by both sides to demonstrate the physical possibility of the collision as contended for by each of the parties. The only dispute in
issue, however, was which vehicle had turned onto its
wrong side of the highway just prior to the impact. The
foregoing summary of the evidence, therefore, should be
sufficient to here illustrate the theory of the respective
parties as defined at the pre-trial and pursued by each
in the presentation of the evidence.
The jury by its verdict unanimously found that the
accident occurred as the eye witnesses said it did upon
defendant's side of the highway. Appellants have not
challenged the correctness of the finding and the judgment, which is upheld by the great weight, if not all, of
the evidence, but here seeks a reversal based upon twelve
alleged assignments of error which we respectfully submit in no sense justify a new trial.
ARGUMENT
CLAIMED ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FAULTY
BRAKES.
I.

As hereinabove shown by the pre-trial orde'r and
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plaintiffs' theory as developed by the evidenee, it is
clear that the ultimate issue for the jury was, which
vehicle turned or was driven onto the wrong side causing
the collision. Under either theory no collision would
have occurred had not one or the other of the vehicles
been driven across the high\\ray. Certainly neither plaintiffs nor defendant at the pre-trial made any claim that
the collision would have occurred had not the other
vehicle been driven across. Counsel for Appellants even
went further and effectively acknowledged that there
was no emergency which caused the Studebaker to swern,
across the highway, as his theory was that the accident
was not caused in that manner.
We direct the court's attention to the fact that the
Inatter of brakes was specifically brought up and discussed at the pre-trial and counsel for Appellants
acknowledged that that matter went only to the ultimate
question of who got on the wrong side.
"The Court: That only goes to the wrong
side.
"Mr. Schoenhals: Yes."
Special verdicts were prepared by the court and on
the morning of the second day of the trial, at a conference in the Judge's chambers, it was specifically agreed
"That a special verdict may be used here to
determine whether or not there is liabilitY, and
that no evidence of damages will be offered. to the
jury until they first determine the question of
whether or not there is liability.'' (R. 361)
In submitting the ultimate question to the jury the
court did not limit either party in thPir rP~Jl<'di,·p
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theories as to why one or either of the vehicles got onto
the wrong side just prior to the collision. Plaintiffs were
not limited in presenting evidence and arguing their
theory to the jury. In fact, counsel was given great leeway in that regard and in particular as to the claimed
matter of brakes.
Plaintiffs' theory that defendant's truck may have
been driven or veered to the left on account of faulty
brakes was no nwre an ultimate issue than the tremendous speed of plaintiffs' Studebaker automobile as
it entered the curve, getting onto the loose gravel and
then careening across the highway. Defendant's requested instruction in this connection (R. 215) was not
given as the agreed procedure and purpose of the special
verdict was to limit the issue to the ultimate and determining fact. The procedure folld'wed by the court to
obtain a finding on the ultimate issue operated so as to
confine both parties to such issue, but neither was limited
in showing any reasons or grounds for their claim that
the other vehicle negligently crossed the highway just
hefore the collision.
Plaintiffs made 35 requested instructions, including
lA, lB, 15A, 16A and 21 A, many of which were not
proper statements of the law. Be that as it may, there
was no need for the court to give the requested instructions of either party when there was one agreed ultimate
Issue.
The court did give appropriate instructions as
would enable the jury to make findings upon the issue
submitted to the1n (R. 87). Included among the instruc-
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tions were the usual instructions upon preponderance of
evidence, pro.ximate cause, credibility of the witness, etc.
Also included among the instructions were the following:
"No. 4
"You are instructed that it was unlawful for
either the driver of the Studebaker automobile
or the driver of the Garrett truck to drive his
vehicle to the left of the center of the highway
upon which he was traveling unless he drove
across the center of the big highway for the purpose of avoiding an accident; and if either driver
drove to the left of the center of the highway at
a time when it was not necessary to do so to avoid
an accident, he would be negligent as a matter of
law." (R. 88)
"No. 4
is defined as the failure to do
that which an ordinarily reasonable prudent person would have done under the same or similar
circumstances, or it is the doing of that which an
ordinarily prudent person would not have done
under the given circumstances of the case. The
fault may lie in acting or in failing to act, and
the duty to act or not to act is measured by the
exigencies of the occasion." (R. 89)
"Negligen~e

The jury unanimously found that the plaintiffs' and
Appellants' vehicle, the Studebaker automobile, was
negligently driven across the center of the highway.
They did not find that the defendant's vehicle was driven
across the highway. Their failure to find that the defendant's vehicle was driven across the center of the highway must be construed against the Appellants, since
they had the burden of proof, and, therefore, it is an
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express finding that the defendant's vehicle was not
driven ac.ross the center of the highway. There is abundant evidence in the record to sustain the jury's finding.

"It is a rule of general application that it is
not the province of the appellate court to weigh
the evidence where it is conflicting. The rule, as
1nore broadly stated in most jurisdictions, is that
the verdict or findings of the jury rendered on
the trial of a case will not be disturbed by a
reviewing court where the evidence is conflicting
and the case has been fairly submitted to the jury
under proper instructions;* * *" 5 C.J.S. 671
Special verdicts are authorized by Rule 49-A, Utah Rules
Of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated 195·3, which
provides:
"(a) SPECIAL VERDICTS. The court may
require a jury to return only a special verdict in
the form of a .special written finding upon each
issue of fact. In that event the court may submit
to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of
categorical or other brief answer or may submit
written forms of the several special findings
which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method
of submitting the issues and requiring the written
findings thereon as it deems most appropriate~
The eourt shall give to the jury such explanation
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as n1ay be necessary to enable the jury
to make its findings upon each issue. If in so
doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by
the pleadings or by the evidence, each party
waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so
omitted unless before the jury retires he demands
its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted
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1

]
without such demand the court may 1nake a find.
ing; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to
have made a finding in accord with the judgment
on the special verdict."
A special verdict is distinguished from a general
verdict in Smith v. Ireland, 4 Utah 187, 7 Pac. 749 as
follows:
"A general verdict is a direct statement of a
conclusion of law, and is an indirect statement of
the facts from which the conclusion is drawn; it
expressly affirms the law and inferentially the
facts. The jury are directed by the court to indicate the facts found from the evidence by the
statement of a conclusion of law. If they beliece
certain facts, they are told to state certain conclusion, a,nd if they do not believe such facts, to state
another conclusion.

'

1

"The court states the law applicable to the
facts which the evidence tends to prove, and if the
jury finds the facts they state the conclusions as
charged. In the case of a general verdict, the
court states the law applicable to the facts before
they are found by the jury, and in a special cerdict the court declares the law applicable to them
afterwards. In either case, the jury is judge of
the facts and the court of the law."
Thus, it is seen that in a general verdict the court
instructs the jury on the law applicable to various factual
situations which the jury ma~y find and the jury actually
applies the law to the facts, as the law has been defined
by the court's instructions, and come up with a verdict
which is actually a conclusion of law. In such an instance,
it is of course proper to instruct the jury a~ to the lnw
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which may be applicable to whatever ultimate facts they
may find under the evidence of the case.
However, a special verdict only requires the jury to
find the ultimate facts and the court, rather than the
jury, applies the law to the facts. There is, therefore,
no necessity for the jury to be instructed upon the law
applicable to all the various aspects of the case. They
only need such instructions as will enable them to determine the ultimate facts.
Moreover, the form of the special verdict should be
concise and should not relate to evidentiary facts.
"Evidential Facts. Questions to the jury
should relate to the ultimate facts, and not merely
to the evidence on which such ultimate facts rest.
The purpose of having the jury find specially on
a particular question is to ascertain the fact itself,
and not merely the evidence which may tend to
prove it, hence, parties to an action have no right,
under the guise of submitting questions of fact
to be found specially by the jury, to require them
to give their views on each item of evidence, thus
practically subjecting them to a cross-examination
as to the en tire case." 53 A1n. J ur. 743
We have in this case two automobiles approaching
each other on a two-lane highway from opposite directions. There can be no ultimate factor which caused the
collision of those two vehicles except that one or the
other or both drove onto the wrong side of the road.
Although there may have been a number of reasons why
one or the other or both would drive on the wrong side
of the road, which might or might not have been negligent, they, in themselves, could not be the proximate
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cause of the accident and, therefore, are not the ultimate
fact on which liability, if any, must rest. For example,
one of the drivers may have failed to keep a proper
lookout, traveled too fast, failed to keep proper control
or driven a vehicle with faulty brakes. Any of the actions
may be negligent but could not, in themselves, cause this
accident. They are only evidence tending to prove the
ultimate issue, that one or the other negligently drove
over the center line onto the wrong side of the road.
Appellants were not precluded from introducing evidence
on the speed of defendant's vehicle, lookout or faulty
brakes; nor were they precluded from using this evidence
in their argument to the jury. The jury, however, were
only concerned with this evidence in its probative value
as to whether defendant's vehicle was negligently driven
onto the wrong side of the highway.
The jury was advised by instruction No. 4 that it
was negligence, under the evidence in this case, for either
driver to drive his car over the center line, regardless of
the reason, faulty brakes or o-therwise, with the one
e-xception that the driver drove onto the wrong side to
avoid an accident. This instruction was sufficiently
broad to cover the theory of the plaintiffs' case and to
enable the jury intelligently to decide the ultimate issue
of fact put to them. It was even more favorable to plaintiffs than was claimed by them at the pre-trial where it
was acknowledged that there was no emergency which
caused the Studebaker to swing out of control and across
the highway.
It is true that a party is entitled to have his theory
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submitted to the jury to the extent that it is supported
by evidence and pleading in the case. rrhis does not
mean that the court n1ust give the exact instructions
requested by a party if the theory is covered in ~sub
stance by the other instructions. The instructions
requested by Appellants in the form requested would
have confused rather than ruded the jury. The jury n1ay
have believed that the brakes on defendant's vehicle
were repaired in a faulty manner and yet, found that
defendant did not drive to the wrong side of the highway
prior to the impact. Under the instructions requested,
a finding of faulty brakes might be understood to compel
a finding that defendant's vehicle was driven to the wrong
side of the highway, a conclusion which does not necessarily follow.
The jury by their unanimous finding that the defendant's truck was not driven to the wrong side of the highway and that the Studebaker was, determined the ultimate issue agreed at the pre-trial. It was the province
of the jury to determine the ultimate issue, as was their
reasons or grounds for so finding.
'Thus it is seen that the court adequately instructed
the jury for them to answer the interrogatories put to
them and was not guilty of prejudicial error by reason
of his not giving the instructions requested ~y both
parties as to why or what reason it was claimed the other
vehicle crossed the highway.
CRoss ExAMINATION OF SHERIFF CuLBERT RoBINSON
Counsel for Appellants complains of the ruling of
the court relative to his cross examination of Sheriff
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Robinson. On page 617 of the Record Mr. Schoenhals,
while cross examining the Sheriff who investigated the
accident, asked this question:
"Q. Sheriff: Are you familiar with the fact
_that there is a State law requiring that all
brakes ... "
The court ruled:
"The Court: Well, now, let me tell the jury
what the law is, and let's not be telling them uy
inference here. If we need any law told to the
jury, I will explain that to then1 so you don't h:_l Ye
to bother the sheriff about it."
The court's ruling was proper :since it is the duty of
the court in a trial of an action to instruct the jury on
what the law is. Counsel should not attempt to instruct
them by his examination of witnesses.
CRoss ExAMINATION OF THEO SoDEN
On page 10 of his Brief, counsel for Appellants
complains of the court's ruling with regard to cross
examination of the witness r~rheo Soden. On page 775 of
the Record counsel asks the question:
"Q. and, therefore, isn't it true that if you
put a newer lining in that you are apt to get le:;;t-i
friction area on a newer lining than you are on
the older lining-~"
Just previous to that question, counsel had asked the
same witness:
"Q.
You wouldn't know. Isn't it also possible that when you place in a new lining, that
the new lining if looked at under a microscope has
like mountains and valleys in it and the area of
friction of the new lining might be much less than
30
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the area of friction on the new lining. Isn't that
the situation~
··A.

Yes, that would be true."

The court instructed the witness that the second
question was repetitious and that he need not answer
the same. A reading of the two questions will show that
the second question was repetitious and that, therefore,
the court's ruling was correct.
II.
NO.4.

CLAIMED ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION

Appellants contend that the court's instruction No.
4, hereafter quoted, was erroneous in that the words
"drive his vehicle to the left of the center of the highway"
were not broad enough to include the movement of the
vehicle to the wrong side of the highway by reason of
faulty brakes. This assignment is essentially a re-argument of the matter under point No. I.
"Instruction No. 4
"You are instructed that it was unlawful for,
either the driver of the Studebaker automobile or
the driver of the Garrett truck to drive his vehicle
to the left of the center of the highway upon which
he was traveling unless he drove across the center
of the highway for the purpose of avoiding an
accident; and if either driver drove to the left
of the center of the highway at a time when it was
not necessary to do so to avoid an accident, he
would be negligent as a matter of law." (R. 88,
Vol. 2)
The court's instruction applied equally to each party
and fairly stated the issue. To specify reasons why
either driver drove to the left amount to a comment on
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the evidence and tend to invade the province of the jury.
Furthermore, counsel for Appellants would undoubtedly
have then claimed that the court, by the instruction,
unduly limited him to brakes as the sole reason why
defendant crossed the highway, if he did so cross.
Respondent might just as well argue that the court
should have supplemented the instruction by commenting on the unlawful and excessive speed, failure of proper
lookout and loss of control, etc. on the part of the operator of the Studebaker automobile. The instruction as
given was fair; in fact even favorable to Appellants in
that Appellants had acknowledged that there was no
emergency which caused the driver of the Studebaker
to veer onto the wrong side. The instruction given did
not suggest to the jury why either vehicle was driven
onto the wrong side, but wisely left the issue to the jury.
Appellants' objections to the instructions of the
court made at the time of the trial are to be found on
page 853, line 24 and 854 of the Record. Now here in therir
objections is there any objection taken to the wordin.g of
the court's mstruction No. 4.
It is axiomatic that in order for one to complain
of an instruction he must do so at the time of trial and
give the trial court an opportunity to correct any error.
"No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto. In objecting to this case giving of an
instruction, a party must state distinctly the mat. ter to which he objects and the grounds for his
objections."
·
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Moreover, the in8truction as given by the court was
sufficiently broad to cover the situation should the jury
have believed frmn the evidence that the defendant's
truck was propelled across a highway by the application
of faulty brakes, was turned in that direction, or for
some other reason crossed over on the wrong side of the
highway. In the sense used in the instruction, "drive" is
defined by \\Tebster to mean:
"To urge on and direct the motions of, as
horse, hence, also to convey in a vehicle" (Websters Collegiate Dictionary 3rd Ed.)
The phrase, "drive his vehicle to the left of the
center of the highway" conotes a number of actions to
persons of ordinary experience and intelligence. It connotes the direction and control of an automobile by the
application of power through an accelerator, the control
of that power by the shifting of gears, the stopping of
the vehicle by the application of brakes, the turning of
an automobile by the steering wheel. Actually the term
"drive" implies to the ordinary individual all the actions
which are necessary to direct and control an automobile
in its course upon a highway. It may imply the absence
of such control and direction when used in such terms
as reckless driving and driving too fast for existing
conditions.

In construing instructions, we must not put a super
technical construction upon the words used, but they
must be construed liberally and in this sense they would
be understood by the jury.
"Instructions should not be subjected to a
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critical analysis, such as is applied in construing
pleadings, statutes, or even contracts. On the
contrary, when reviewed, they. shoul~ be ac~orded
fair and reasonable constructwn, w1th a v1ew to
-ascertaining the meaning probably placed upon
them by the jury. It is ele1nentary that an instnlCtion should be interpreted in the light of the evidence and theories presented by the re8pective
parties and that several instructions are to be
consid~red together as constituting the single
charge of the court. The words employed should
be accorded their natural and accepted meaning,
and even though an instruction is not in the
language approved by usuage, it will be held
sufficient if couched in terms plainly conveying
the same meaning." 2 Bancrofts Code Practice
And Remedies 1990.
The jury had listened to evidence for four days,
expert and otherwise, all of which was directed toward
proving which vehicle was on the wrong side of the highway at the time of impact. Appellants had thoroughly
explored their theory, that the defendant's vehicle was
pr:opelled across the highway by the application of faulty
brakes. Both in the examination of witnesses and in
argument they were allowed great leeway even to the
extent of demonstrating how they claimed the collision
occurred. The jury had the issue, the theories and the
evidence well in mind and natural1~, would interpret the
instruction given in light of them.
In view of the evidence and the plain meaning of
the word "drive", there can be no question that the
instruction given by the court was understood hy the
jury to cover a situation (if the jur~, had chosen to believe
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the evidence to that effect) where the driver of defendant's vehicle drove his vehicle onto the wrong side of the
road, whether by an application of faulty brakes or otherwise. Their answer in the defendant's favor must be
construed as a finding that the defendant's vehicle did
not pass onto the wrong side of the road prior to the
impact between the two vehicles.
III. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS 1-B, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 26 and 27.

Consistent with the theory of the case as claimed
by both parties, we have pointed out why it was not necessary for the trial court to give the· requested instructions of either party as the matter was fairly resolved
in the form of special verdicts. Counsel for Appellants'
argument under this topic seems calculated to overemphasize the matter of brakes when it was no more
related to the ultimate issue than the terrific speed,
loss of control and reckless conduct on the part of the
operator of the Studebaker. Appellants were no more
limited than was Respondent.
Appellants were in no manner limited in their evidence or argument to the jury. The Record shows
counsel for Respondents was given great latitude in
showing the brake condition and in illustrating and
demonstrating to the jury, to the extent that if any complaint is due the complaint should justifiably be made
by defendant in permitting undue repetition. Certainly
the statements asserted by counsel for Appellant as to
such matters are wholly without foundation.
A review of the Record ( R. 853-854) will show that
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Appellants made no objections at the time of trial to the
court's failure to give requested instructions 4, 5, 6, 8,
11, 16, 17, 26 and 27. No reasons were assigned why arvy
of the requested instructions should have been given,
and for reasons heretofore mentioned they cannot now
be heard to complain at this tirne. Furthern1ore, counsel
for Appellants' argument here is most certainly contrary
to his statement to the trial court at the time of pre-trial
that the matter of brakes, etc. only went to the ultimate
issue of why either driver drove to the wrong side.
It further appears that counsel for Appellants
entirely overlooks the fundamental difference between a
trial where all issues are resolved in the forn1 of a general
verdict and a case tried by special verdicts under the
new rules, particularly where the matter of special verdict is determined at pre-trial and by agreement in open
court. Where there is a general verdict, as we have heretofore pointed out, the jury is required to resolve all
issues and both find the facts and apply the law. When
a special verdict is submitted the law is applied' by the
court to the facts as found by the jury.
In the case here before the court the jury's finding
that the defendant did not negligently drive its truck
onto the wrong side of the highway, that is that the
defendant was not negligent, rnade any further inquir.,·
into the evidentiary facts or any further application of
law unnecessary, except by entry of appropriate jud:~
ment by act of the court. In any event in this case the
rules of law to be applied would be applied by the court
based on the ultimate facts as found hy the jury, and
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there is no reason why the jury should be instructed on
law they were not oxpected to apply.
Appellants' complaint at page 14 of the court's
refusal to give requested instructions No. 26 and 27
(R. 202-3) is inconsistent with the theory of either party.
In the first instance, no exceptions whatsoever were
taken to the refusal of the court to give plaintiffs'
reque8tion instructions No. 26 and 27 (seeR. 854). Plaintiffs at the trial did not make any claim that both units
were riding the center line, and certainly the giving of
instructions in that regard would have been erroneous
under the evidence produced and contrary to the theory
of either party as determined at the pre-trial. The
theory of both parties and all the evidence presented was
to the effect that the impact occurred clearly on one side
of the road or the other, and not in the center or near the
center of the road, and that one or the other of the parties was entirely to blame, but not both. The evidence
showed that the right front side of defendant's vehicle
collided with the left front fender of the plaintiffs'
vehicle. This being the case, one of the vehicles would
have to be clearly on the wrong side of theroad at the
time the two vehicles met. Had both of the vehicles been
riding the center of the highway, the point of impact
between the two vehicles would have been toward the
left side of each vehicle.
Furthermore the tire marks, as evidenced by both
parties, especially in the light of the testimony of the
eye witnesses, necessarily showed that the impact
occurred near the defendant's right hand shoulder or
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where Bowman et al placed the alleged Studebaker marks
entirely on the east side or in plaintiffs' proper lane of
traffic.
Let us suppose that the jury had been instructed
that the brakes should be adjusted equally and that the
jury found that the defendant's were not so adjusted;
or that they had been instructed on keeping a reasonable
lookout and found that the defendant did not keep a
proper lookout; or that they had been instructed on
reasonable speed and found that the defendant 'n:s drj\·ing unreasonably fast. None of these findings would
compel or even direct a verdict for the plaintiffs in this
action. None of these actions could have been the ultimate proximate cause of the accident under the evidence
and the theory of both parties. They are merely evidentiary in nature and, if true, would tend to show at
1nost that the defendant did, in fact, drive over to the
wrong side of the highway which was the ultimate fact
to be decided by the jury.
IV. REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO PERMIT
GRANT STAPLES TO TESTIFY.

The Record beginning on page 526 will show that
the plaintiffs called Grant Staples to testify on behalf
of the Appellants. At that point, the Appellants had
introduced about 21 pictures and 7 different diagrams,
picturing the various marks on the highway at the scene
of the accident and the damage to the two vehicles. He
had also covered the marks on the highway in great
detail by four witnesses, Harry T. Bowman, .James A.
Middleton, Harold Staples and Franklin Rtuart Harris,
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I

l

Jr. After Appellants' counsel had shown that Grant
Staples had visited the area on the 20th of October, the
day after the accident in question, the court asked Appellants' counsel :
"The Court: Is this testimony just going to
be cumulative of what Mr. Bowman and Mr. Harold Staples have testified to?
"Thfr. Schoenhals: I am going to have him
draw a map of what he saw on the road.
"The Court: We have got so many maps, we
will never find them. Is it only going to be cumulative of what these other men have testified tof
"Mr. Schoenhals: Yes.
"The Court: Let's not have that." (R. 528)
The Appellants then attempted to go into a description of the various marks on the highway and was permitted to do so to the point that it appeared that this
witness would not testify to anything which had not
already been testified to by previous witnesses.
There must be an end to an inquiry at some point.
When it appears that previous witnesses have given the
sa1ne evidence and that a witness's testimony is merely
cumulative of what prior witnesses have testified, the
trial judge, in his discretion, may exclude further testimony.
"There seems to be no doubt as to the right
of a trial court, in the exercise of a sound and
reasonable judicial discretion, to limit the number
of witnesses that may be sworn by either party to
a controversy covering a certain fact in issue. The
trial court has power to direct the course of the
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trial and as one of the necessary incidents of that
' it may limit the nun1ber of Witnesses
.
power
as to
a certain point, when, in its opinion, further testimony on the point would be n1erely cumulative
and of no assistance to the jury." (21 A. L. R. 335.
See also 48 A. L. R. 947; Skeen v. Mooney, 8 Utah
157, 30 Pac. 363)
There is no question that the testimony of Grant
Staples was 1nerely cumulative of what had already been
covered in great detail by the exhibits and other witnesses. It was well within the discretionary power of the
trial court to exclude further evidence and the refusal
to permit Grant Staples to duplicate the testimony was
not error. It was similar to the court's suggestion to
which Respondent agreed that the testimony of Utah
Highway Patrolman Eldon C. Sherwood would be cumulative as to the sa1ne marks and measurements as the
other investigating officers which they made the morning of the accident.
V. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING QUESTIONS TO THE WITNESS HARRIS, AS TO HIS OPINIONS,
TO BE SUBMITTED IN THE FORM OF HYPOTHETICAL
QUESTIONS.

We cannot agree with Appellants' statement and
conclusions nor the record as they have represented it
to this court.
An examination of the Record (R. 337-526) will
reveal that Dr. F·ranklin S. Harris was permitted to
answer direct questions on those material and relevant
facts which were within his own knowledge. He was
permitted to testify as to the tests he made, the observa40
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tions he Inade, n1easure1nents and marks that he found on
the highway; hmvever, the court did require that in que8tions asked of him as to his opinion in regard to the
movements followed by the vehicles before and after the
impact the factors upon which he was basing his opinion
be set out either by n1eans of hypothetical questions or
otherwise.
The witness Harris was asked as an expert presumably to assist the jury in a scientific analysis of the
evidence. As an ffiq)ert, his testimony, of course, would
only be of value to the jury in those matters which were
beyond their own knowledge and experience or, as otherWise stated, were not a matter of common knowledge.
"Expert opinion testimony, while not limited
or restricted in its scope to matters of science, art,
or skill, is not allowed to invade the field of common knowledge. Such testimony cannot be received
either to prove or to disprove those things which
are supposed to lie within the common knowledge,
experience, and education of n1en. It is inadmissible where the matter under consideration is of
such a character that anyone of ordinary intelligence, without any peculiar habits or course of
study, would be able to form a correct opinion.
If the subject is one of common knowledge, as to
which the facts can be intelligently described to
the jury and understood by them and they can
form a reasonable opinion for themselves, the
opinion of an expert will be rejected. The mere
fact that a witness may know 1nore concerning
the subject of inquiry and may better comprehend
it than the jury does not qualify him as an expert
whose opinion testimony may be given, unless the
subject of inquiry relates to some trade, profes-
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sion, science, or art in which persons instructed
therein by study or experience may be supposed
to have more skill and knowledge than jurors of
average intelligence. Unless the subject of inquiry
does relate to smne trade, profession, science, or
art, it is within the province of the jury to form
their own opinion, and not of witnesses, although
experts, to express theirs. It is possible that the
jurors may have less skill and sxperience than
the witnesses and yet be able to draw their own
conclusions. Expert testimony is not available
for the purpose of giving a word of common meaning a technical significance." (20 Am. Jur. 651)
Moreover, the expert should not be allowed to invad~
the province of the jury. That is, where an opinion is
based on facts on which there is a conflict of evidence,
it should be clear to the jury that the weight of the
opinion depends on what facts the jury may find to be
true.
"Every expert opinion rests upon an assumption of fact; if the opinion is given upon a hypothetical question, its weight depends wholly on the
jury finding that the assumed facts have been
proved; if it is based on the expert's own testimony as to the facts, the truth of this testimony is
no less open to their belief or disbelief; and, in
addition, the soundness of the opinion itself is
to be determined by the jury in consideration of
its apparent reasonableness or their confidence
in the skill and trustworthiness of the witness, and
of any contradiction from any other expert~."
(20 Am. Jur. 654)
It is, therefore, important that the jury know the
facts or basis on which the expert predicates his opinion:
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otherwise, the opinion is rneaningless to them for they
have no way of determining when the opinion may come
into play.
"Opinion testimony of an e.xpert witness rnay
be based upon facts within his own knowledge
which he details to the jury before giving his
opinion or upon hypothetical questions embracing
facts supported by the evidence and relating to the
particular matter upon which the expert's opinion
is sought, which facts, for the purpose of the
opinion, are assumed to be true." (20 Am. Jur.

661)
In the case of conflicting testimony, the questions
must necessarily be formed in the form of hypothetical
questions. To permit otherwise will allow the expert to
invade the province of the jury and resolve conflicts in:
testimony which should be resolved by the jury.
"All courts agree that if there is any conflict
between the witnesses as to facts on which an
expert opinion is sought, the expert witness cannot, although he has heard the testimony, be
asked to base his opinion on that testimony,
because, to reach his conclusion, he must necessarily invade the province of the jury and pass
on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
the evidence. In cases of conflict in the testimony
heard by experts, a hypothetical statement of facts
upon which their opinion is sought is required.
It is generally agreed also that if the facts testified to by other witnesses are doubtful and remain
to be found by the jury, it is improper to ask an
expert who has heard the evidence for his opinion
based upon such evidence. Also where the matter
of allowing the expert to testify on the evidence
is left to the discretion of the trial court, it is
43
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

held improper to incorporate testimony bodily in
a complicated question." (20 Am. Jur. 664)
As was held in the case of Diaz et al v~ Iwdustrial
Commission of Utah, 80 Utah 77, 13 Pac. (2d) 307, answers to hypothetical questions not founded upon, but
contrary to, the established facts in the case can have no
provative value.
1\tloreover, an expert witness may not be permitted
to assume facts when there is no evidence of such facts
in the Record. In the case of Braddock v. Pacific Woodmen Life .Ass'n., 89 Utah 75, 54 Pac. (2d) 1189, in which
the issue before the court was the cause of the person's
death, the hypothetical question asked of an expert witness, a doctor, was based on the assumption that the deceased had appeared to be strong and healthy during the
months and for many years prior to the time he received
a certain injury. The undisputed testimony was that he
had had an attack of flu and other disturbances during
that period of time. The hypothetical question assumed
that there was an infection in the toe which had been injured and a fractured hip, of which there is no evidence.
The trial court overruled an objection and permitted tlw
doctor to state his opinion. The court said:
"The objection should have been sustained.
(Citation given) Relevant matters in evidence respecting the deceased's visits to doctors, an attack
of the flu, his hyperacidity of the stomach, hi::-:
myocardiac condition, and the prescribing of digitalis for it, were entirely omitted from the quP~
tion, while the witness was asked to assume tlu•
applicant was in good health, the very matter in
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controver~y,

prior to his final illness. The doctor
was also permitted to assume there was infectjon
in the toe injury, and that the assured suffered a
fractured hip of which there was no evidence.
• • * 'Vhile it is permissible that a hypothetical
question be predicated on a statement of facts
detailed by witnesses for one of the parties ( citation), the question here omitted undisputed facts
and included others not supported by evidence.
Obviously, the question was improper and misleading."
Let us now examine some of the rulings of the court
which the Appellants claim were erroneous. On page 437
of the Record, all the court did after the Appellants'
counsel had been leading the witness for some time was
to caution counsel as follows:
"The Court: Let me ask you not to lead this
witness. You only let your witness say 'Yes' and
you take a half an hour giving your question. Let
the witness tell what he did, and we will get
through quicker."
On page 440 of the Record, the witness volunteered
the information that a pin on the truck was in such a
position that it made the mark which was found upon the
Studebaker. Upon a motion to strike, the court ruled:
"The Court: I think that that might go out
and the jury told to disregard it. He could give
the height of the pin as compared to other matters."
There can be no question but that the answer invaded
the province of the jury, whose duty it was to determine
what made the marks on the Studebaker.
All the, way through the questioning of this witness,
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counsel for the Appellants would ask his questions in a
manner which merely required the witness to answer
"Yes." On page 444, after four such questions, the court
said:
"'The Court: Mr. Schoenhals, you are leading this man. I am going to have to stop it. You
have an expert down here who has something to
tell the jury, and the only thing you let him say
is 'Yes'. That is not proper. I have been overruling counsel so much I guess he has just given up
making his objections, but I am fast going to insist that you let this witness tell his story and not
lead him."
On page 446 of the Record, counsel for the Appellants asked the expert Harris :
"Doctor, calling your attention to Exhibit B,
and particularly to the two marks in the red
square between X2 and X, if you-do you have
an opinion as to whether or not the two units C· nning together where the tractor and trailer was
moving at a speed of between thirty-seven and
thirty-nine miles per hour and where the Studebaker involved was traveling at a similar rate of
speed, as to whether or not the impact at the angle
you assume existed would or would not make any
movement with respect to the rear duals of th:•
tractor sufficient to make a noticeable mark on
the highway~"
The question presumed that the Studebaker automobile was traveling at the same rate of speed as the tractor-trailer-37-39 miles an hour, (all of the evidence was
that it was traveling about 80 miles per hour) and assumed an impact at a certain angle. There was no evidence in the Record that the Studebaker automobile was
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:r:
~

going 37 miles per hou... v:r that the point of impact was
where the question assuu1ed it to be. Moreover, the doctor was not asked to make any conclusion, but the question was put to determine if the very factors to be assumed were already established. The court recessed before ruling was had on the objection to the question and
apparently counsel abandoned the question and the ruling was neYer forthcoming (R. 447).
On page ±55 of the Record, the witness was asked to
tell the jury what he observed with regard to skid marks.
The court instructed counsel that the witness had been
brought down to court as an expert and that, as an expert, he had to assume certain things to be true. That if
counsel intended to use him merely as a lay witness his
testimony would be merely cumulative of what the court
already had and that he should be used as an expert on
assumed facts.
On page 459 the doctor was asked to assume the rear
dual wheels were in a certain position and that the tractor was 25 feet long. The doctor was then asked if this
were true, where would the front end of the tractor be.
Of course, it is elementary that the front end of the tractor would be 25 feet ahead of the rear dual wheels. The
court ruled that that was merely a 1natter of sixth grade
arithmetic and not a matter on which an expert's opinion
was needed.
On page 468 of the Record, the witness was asked to
express his opinion as to the movement the Studebaker
would take after the impact, if the Studebaker and tractor met at the angle the witness had indicated. The witness answered:
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"A. If there were a collision between two
cars of this type taking place on the right front
fender of the tractor, left front fender of the
Studebaker shown by the damage to the two respective cars, fron1 the dan1ages to the two we
can't say exactly what the contact angle is. \Ye
know that these two collided first because this is
where the damage-it is only on this side and the
imprint of license plate on this fender and the
scratch marks across here. Now, from the examination of these shown in the pictures which were
discussed earlier indicate that this is the type of
thing which would do that damage* * *."
At that point the court stopped the doctor and asked
him not to argue the facts, but rather to state his opinion as to the movement the Studebaker would take and
the witness was then allowed to state his opinion.
On page 483 of the Record, the witness was asked to
assume that the Studebaker was 100 feet from the tractor when it cut across the highway and that it was going
more than 30 miles an hour. There was no evidence in
the Record at that point before the court that the Studebaker was 100 feet away from the tractor when the
Studebaker cut across the highway. The objection was
sustained.
On page 884 of the Record, the doctor was asked to
assume the impact occurred at the point indicated on
Exhibit "GG" and assume that the Studebaker came to
rest at the point shown on Exhibit "A" and as shown in
&xhibit "E" and then asked, considering the relativr
movement of the Studebaker and tractor if that would
be consistent with the impact occurring at the point
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where he found it to oecur in Exhibit "GG".
The question was faulty in a nun1ber of respects.
First of all, it as·sumes that the impact occurred at "GG"
and asks if it did occurr at ''GG", if that would be consistent with the i1npact occurring at "GG". Secondly, it
was repetitious and the question was not put on the basis
of any evidence, but rather is an assumption based on the
assumption.
On page 518 of the Record, on redirect examination,
the witness was asked to step down from the witness chair
and to show the jury the complete movement of the two
units as they engaged each other. The witness had been
asked substantially the same thing and covered the same
point on direct examination. The evidence was objected,
to on the grounds that it was repetitious. The court sustained the objections on that ground and on the ground
that it was also argumentative and that the court did not
believe that it would be proper for the expert to demonstrate his theory to the jury, that being a matter for
counsel to do in his argument. The witness was then permitted to give his measurements as to the movements
of the automobile.
On page 520 of the Record, the witness was asked,
assuming that the marks on the rear of the truck were
made do you have an opinion as to whether or not the
Studeba b~r could have gone up in between the rear duals
and made a particular mark~ The court sustained an
objection to the question on the grounds that it did not
understand what facts were being assumed by the doetor and could not tell from the question whether or not it
J'(~quired an expert's opinion.
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It is rather difficult to pull questions out of the context of the Record, together with a ruling on the particular question, and give the court a clear picture of the
rules of evidence involved. In order to do that thoroughly, it would be necessary to set out the complete examination of the witness. A reading of the Record discloses
that the questions asked of this witness in those instances
where the court sustained an objection to them, were improperly framed. They did not state the facts to be assumed, or assumed facts which were not in the evidenr(l.
Many of the questions were leading. Others were not
matters of e.xpert opinion or invaded the province of the
jury, or were repetitious. The court, rather than excluding testimony that should have been admitted, on occasions, allowed technically improper questions to be answered in order to get the benefit of the expert's opinion
before the jury, which Appellants were permitted to do
in full and in great detail.
VI. CLAIMED ERROR OF THE COURT IN DIRECTING
THE TRIAL.

(a) Statement with respect to reading part of
Noyes' statement.
An examination of the Record in which the statement quoted by Appellants appears, will show that the
ruling of the court was not erroneous and the statement
was not only not prejudicial to the Appel1ants but actually in their favor.
Starting on page 747 of the Record, the proceedings
were as follows :
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"Q. Showing you this statement here, this is
your signature on this page, isn't it~
"A.

Yes.

"Q. It says, 'Just before the in1pact of the
two vehicles, the truck driver made a sharp turn
to the left.' Doesn't it say that there~
":Mr. Hanson: Go ahead and read the rest
of it.
"~Ir. Schoenhals: Just a minute. Your Honor
I object to ~ir. Hanson"The Court: Yes. I think you ought not direct counsel.
"~Ir. Hanson: Well"Mr. Schoenhals:

I think if he is going to-

"The Court: Just a minute. Let me tell
him something. If Mr. Schoenhals isn't asking
these questions to suit you, make your objection
to me.
"Mr. Hanson: If your Honor please, I object
to counsel not reading the whole question, just
reading part and stopping there. I could follow
him read, and he read half and stopped.
"The Court: Go ahead. He may answer.
You may have him read the rest of it.

"Q. Just before the impact of the two vehicles, the truck driver made a sharp turn to the
left. Is that correct¥
"A. That is correct, but the rest of the sentence on there-

"Q. Don't be anxious to help him out. You
will get an opportunity, Mr. Noyes, to help him all
you want.
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· "Mr. Hanson: Just a minute. I object to
Mr. Schoenhals arguing with the witness.
"The Court: The objection is overruled. Go
ahead, Mr. Schoenhals; and I say this to you: If
either of these lawyers reads you half of a question, you might assume they are trying to deceive
you. That should be lesson enough to you gentlemen if you don't read all that question you will
find out they are going to think you are a stinker."
The remark complained of was made during a provoked argument between counsel and was made for the
purpose of bringing that argument to an end and getting
on with the trial. As was said in Haslam v. Morrison,
113 Utah 14, 190 Pac. (2d) 520 which involved a digression of a witness rather than counsel:
"But we must keep in mind that judges need
not sit as sphinxes on the bench, nor should they
be mere un1pires. 'fhey should, to a certain extent, guide the course of the trial and when a witness is wandering or digressing, tactfully bring
him back into line."
As is seen, the remark was proper in the court's conduct of the proceeding. But, assuming that it was not,
there is nothing prejudicial to the Appellants about the
remark. It does not pass upon the merits of either part~·'s
evidence, nor did it single out one counsel as against
the other and hold him up to the ridicule, but the remark
was addressed to both.
In McClure v. Donovan (Cal.), 195 Pac. (2d) 901
the court expressed a desire to have a certain w i tm•s::;
testify whom the defendant did not call, even though the
witness was present. The remarks of the rourt, to whi<'h
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s.~eption

was taken, were made during an argu1nent as
to whether or not the witness should be called. The comment of court was held not to be prejudicial.

In Seidenberg v. George (Cal.), 172 Pac. (2d) 891,
such remarks as •• We are wasting a lot of time" made by
the court in an effort to hasten the trial were held not
to be prejudicial.
In Palmer v. City of Long Beach (Cal)., 189 Pac.
(2d) 62, the appellant, after resting, stated that he desired to make a motion in chambers, to which the court
replied, "Make the motion and I will rule." This remark
was held not to be prejudicial.
In Key et ux v. British American Oil Producing Co.
(Okla.), 167 Pac. (2d) 657, where the trial judge criticized counsel for examining a juror at length before exercising a preemptory challenge; and where on another
occasion the trial judge said of appellant's counsel, "We
are going to have to hold (named counsel) down or he
will run away with the courthouse"; and where on another occasion during appellant's examination of the
witness, during which he was leading the witness, the
court said, "I will have to swear you", the remarks were
held not to be prejudicial.
The court quoted the following from the Corpus
Juris with approval:
"Where counsel engaged in the trial of an action is guilty of impropriety of misconduct, a
proper admonition, censure or rebuke by.the presiding judge, in the presence and hearing of the
jury, is ordinarily not prejudicial, where not
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couched in intemperate language, although it i8
ordinarily preferable that any rebuke be administered in the jury's absence. The judge is justified in using to counsel language sufficiently
pointed and emphatic to put an end to objectionable conduct, and some warmth or asperity in
interchanges between counsel and the court will
not give ground for complaint, particularly in a
hotly contested case." 64 C. J. 92, sec. 93.
"Improprieties or irregularities in the conduct of a judge are fatal, however, only where
there is such departure from proper and orderly
method of disposing of the action that the substantial rights of a party are materially affected.
The manner or emphasis or force of expression
of a judge that cannot be reasonably interpreted
to express a wrong opinion as to the law or facts,
or to express an opinion of a fact which should be
left wholly to the jury, cannot be assigned as
error, so mere decisiveness or abruptness of manner is not necessarily objectionable, nor is impatience, discourtesy, or bad manners, provided the
essentials of sound judicial conduct are not violated, and complaint cannot ordinarily be made
of the tone of voice used by the judge, unless some
actual error is committed." 64 C. J. 102, sec. 107
Thus it is seen that the remarks of court were not
in error and were not prejudicial to the appellant's case.
(b) Refusal of the Court to permit Sheriff Culbert Robinson to state his knowledge of state law.
Counsel for the plaintiffs asked Sheriff Robinson to
state whether or not he knew the State law required the
brakes on a vehicle to be in equal adjustment. The court
did not permit the sheriff to answer that question. Ap-
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pellants n1isconceive the basis of the court's ruling to
be that the question is leading. Actually the objection
is more fundmnental. It calls for a witness to inform the·
court or the jury of what the law is. The rule of law in
this instance \vas contained in a state statute of which
the court takes judicial notice. It is the province of the
court to instruct the jury as to the law and it is not
proper for the counsel, either directly or through an e;xJamination of witnesses, to instruct or tell the jury what
the law is.
"It may be laid down as a general rule that a
witness is never permitted to give his opinion on
a question of domestic law or in other matters
which involve questions of law. This rule is applicable to both expert and non-expert witnesses.
Testimony of expert witnesses is, in general, confined to rna tters of fact, as distinguished frmn
matters of law. Opinion testimony of expert lawyers upon legal questions, other than that as to
the law of another jurisdiction or that which
amounts to a conclusion of a law, cannot be properly received in evidence, for the determination
of ·such questions is exclusively within the province of the court. A party cannot appeal to a jury
to decide legal questions by giving in evidence the
opinions of public officers." 20 Am. J ur. 672.
See also Idaho Forwarding Company v. Firemen!s
Fund Ins. Co., 8 Utah 41, 29 Pac. 826, where the witness
was not permitted to testify "how long the insurance
was to be", where the same was specifically covered by
the written policy of insurance which was in evidence.
See also North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v.
Utah & Salt Lake Canal Company, 16 Utah 246, 52 Pac.
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168, where it was held error to allow a witness to explain
the purposes of a canal company and the powers of the
corporation when the same were outlined in the Articles
of Incorporation, held to be equivalent of law.
If there was any inference drawn by the jury that
counsel for the Appellants was trying to deceive them as
to what the law applicable to the situation was, the fault
lay in the asking of an improper question, which called
for an adverse ruling, rather than from the ruling itself,
which we have demonstrated was perfectly proper.
Appellants' counsel's statements and version do not
correctly reflect the Record. He was given great leeway in cross examining witnesses and presenting his
theory, which greatly limited defendant in the amount
of time available to present its evidence.
VII. PERMITTING THE JURY TO CARRY ON UNTIL
ABOUT 10 P. M. WITH THE CASE.

The Appellants cite a self serving affidavit filed by
them in support of a motion for a new trial as authority
for the proposition that they were not given sufficient
notice to having witnesses present and testify, particularly Dr. Freeman of Fillmore, Utah. The Record will
show that at the end of the third day on Wednesday the
following discussion occurred between the court and
counsel:
"The Court: * * *Let me inquire, how many
more witnesses will we have on liability1
"Mr. Hanson: We will have Your Honor,
possibly three, one of whom will he rather long
and the other two rather short. I won't say who
they will he neceRsarily unless ~·ou want m~ to.

56
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"The Court:
"Thlr. Hanson:
nesses.

No.
But there will be three wit-

"The Court: We will finish in good time by
noon1
'"Thir. Hanson: In addition to those three,
there may be two other witnesses on the mechanism of the truck.
"The Court: We had better plan that we will
have tomorrow on the liability, tomorrow morning.
"Mr. Hanson: I think a good part of tomorrow mornrng.
"Mr. Schoenhals : Will I need any witnesses
here tomorrow 1
"The Court: If you have rebuttal on this liability, probably you should have them.
"Mr. Schoenhals: By noon 1
"The Court: He might not go more than
eleven o'clock. We are Tunning behind our schedule. Let's have them.
"Mr. Hanson: If Your Honor please, I don't
think we will go much more than eleven o'clock.
"The Court: Probably you should have yours
here by eleven o'clock." (R. 648)

It, therefore, appears by the record that counsel for
the plaintiffs was given ample notice that he should have
any witnesses that he planned to use in rebuttal in court
my 11 :00 A.M. Thursday morning. Nowhere in the Re·cord does it appear that counsel for the plaintiffs made
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any objection to the court's continuing on and completing the case Thursday evening. The fact is it was his
suggestion at the commencement of the case that it
wouldn't take longer.
At the conclusion of the defendant's evidence, the
Appellants were given an opportunity to put on their
rebuttal (R. 819). At the conclusion of their rebuttal evidence the Appellants rested (R. 846).
Nothing was said at that time in regard to the Appellants' wishing to call another witness on Friday. ~\p
pellants rested unqualifiedly. The Appellants' Brief
goes into what it is claimed Dr. Freeman would have
testified had he been called. However, nowhere in the
Record is there any mention made that the Appellants
planned to call Dr. Freeman or any offer of proof made
as to what he might have been e.xpected to testify. He
was never subpoenaed.
Appellants argue that it appeared to the jury that it
was the plaintiffs' fault that they were being retained
until ten P.M. Such a conclusion was unwarranted. The
trial was concluded earlier in the evening and the jury
was being retained not by the plaintiffs but by the court.
It is only natural that if they felt any resentment, the
resentment would be manifested toward the court rather
than toward either of the parties. Even assuming that the
jury blamed the parties for their being there until 10 :00
P.M., there appears to be no reason why they should
blame the plaintiffs any more than the defendants. In
other words, there appears to be no reason why the jury
should be particularly prejudiced against the plaintiffs
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by reason of the fact that they were required to stay until 10 :00 p .~I.
The jury in this case was not greatly inconvenienced
or kept up during the evening. If this court were to hold
the trial courts were required, without exception, to adjourn at the hour of 5:00 P.:M., regardless of the fact
that a case might be finished inside of a few more hours,
the holding would greatly hamper the administration of
justice and add expense to the State. It was upon Appellants' representations that there was need to go beyond
the fourth day. ~lost of the time spent after 6 :00 P.M.
was spent in instructing the jury and their deliberations
in the jury roon1.
The determination of the manner in which a trial
or hearing is conducted is a matter which lies within the
discretion of the trial court and should not be interferred
with by this court unless it clearly appears that the trial
court abused its discretion, and that the parties were not
given a fair trial.

In the case of Kern County Finance Co. v. Iriart
(Cal.) 79 Pac. (2d) 764, counsel for one of the parties
was committed to jail for a contempt of court in failing
to obey its orders and admonitions. The claim was made
that, by reason of loss of sleep, the counsel was too tired
to continue with the case the following day. Nothing appeared in the Record which indicated the incapacity of
counsel except that he asked for an adjournment for the
noon recess at ten minutes to twelve, which was granted.
The court held that there was nothing prejudicial in the
manner in which the case was conducted.
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In Gunn v. Superior Court, (Cal.) 173 Pac. (2d) 3~~,
counsel was given an hour to argue his case, which he
claimed was insufficient to present his argument to the
court. The court held :
"The determination of the manner in which a
trial or hearing in a court is to be carried on lies
within the province of the court before which such
proceeding is pending; and it is not for an appellate court to say that it should have proceeded in
one way or another as long as no statutory or constitutional rights of the parties were infringed.
And how much time parties may be allowed for
argument in a trial before a court sitting without
a jury, or whether they are to be allowed any at
all, are matters within the discretion of the court
before whom the hearing is had."
Thus it is seen that the manner in which the trial
is conducted is a matter within the discretion of the trial
judge. The appellate court should not give its opinion
as to how this trial court should have proceeded unless it
appears that there was clearly an abuse of that discretion. From an examination of the Record in this ra~~,
it appears that the Appellants were given every opportunity to present their evidence and argument. In a trial
which lasted four days with a very simple issue of fact,
approximately the first two and one-half days and the
last half day were taken by the Appellants. Out of the
four days, the Appellants consumed approximately three.
It is submitted that they now have no valid grounds for
complaint.
VIII.

STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT.

It is asserted that counsel for the defendant, during-
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the course of his argu1uent, extended his hand to the
driver of the defendant's truck, who is supposed to have
displayed a "long, sad and forlorn face" and stated that
the plaintiffs had charged him with the responsibility of
the death of the people involYed. This matter is nowhere
in the Record, and the e.xaggerations of counsel for Appellants are neither justified nor substantiated, nor do we
find any objection in the Record as to any misconduct of
counsel during closing argument. This fact alone should
dispose of counsel's argument on this point.
However, if the statement was made, it is not understood how it can be objectionable, since the statement
is a true appraisal of the situation. Plaintiff's charged
the defendant in their complaint and all through the trial
with negligently causing the death and injury of the
people involved. This was the very essence of their case.
Of course, the defendant, being a fictional entity, could
only act through some person. The driver and other
agents or servants of the defendant having the custody,
control and management of the vehicle, the instrumentality through which or upon which they operated, were the
persons through whom the defendant acted. In reality
then, any accusation against the defendant was an accusation of the persons through whom the defendant acted.
rrhe driver here, in every sense of the word, was being
charged, along with other employees and agents of the
defendant, with negligently causing the death or injury
of the persons involved, and this assignment of error is
without any basis.
IX.

EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES.

Pages 256-260 of the Record will show the proceed-
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ings which went on at the commencement of the trial in
chambers relative to the exclusion of witnesses. The Record will show that all of the defendant's witnesses, with
the exception of Laren Somsen, were excluded from the
court room. The Record does not show that the Appellants ever objected to Mr. Somsen's remaining in the
court room and it was determined if not agreed in chambers that defendant could have its driver and employee
present. Appellants cannot now be heard to object to
something to which they had no objections at the time
the arrangements were made in chambers, and no objection was made at the time of trial.
"It has been said that where the rule regarding the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom is invoked, unless some good reason is
shown, all of the witnesses should be included.
There are, however, some exceptions to the rule
which are generally recognized. F'or example, the
rules do not apply to a party to the action( and a
corporation can only be represented by an employee), although there may be several parties
on one side of the case. The same is true of one
directly interested in the result of the trial. It is
also said that the rule is inapplicable to an attorney for one of the parties, even though he is also
represented on the trial by other attorneys; but
the action of the trial court in excluding one of
the attorneys for a party has been upheld. An
sxception to the rule has been applied in favor
of a detective attached to the office of the prosecuting attorney or other officer whose duty it i~
to assist that officer in preparing cases. While it
is usual also to except expert witnesses from the
rule, a refusal to do so is in error and it has been
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said that witnesses in rebuttal do not go under
the rule." 53 Am. Jur. -!7.
The defendant in this case was a corporation. Laren
Somsen was an e1nployee of that corporation and knew
more about this particular accident and was more directly involved than any other agent or en1ployee of the
corporation. When a corporation is a party to a lawsuit,
it has a right to be represented by some agent or employee of the corporation in the same manner as any other
party. The fact that the agent or employee may also be
a witness, should no more exclude him from the trial than
any party to a lawsuit.
The reason for the rule excluding witnesses is to prevent witnesses from modifying their testimony to coincide to the testimony given by prior witnesses, which is
a very desirable objective. On the other hand, we must
not so tie an attorney's hands that he is unable to present
his case or defense intelligently and effectively. He must
have available to him during the course of the trial someone who is thoroughly acquainted with the facts of the
accident. This principle has been recognized in a number
of similar cases where courts have refused to exclude
complaining witnesses and, as illustrated by the citation
above, have refused to exclude a detective or other officers who have assisted in the preparation of a case.
In this case, then, we see that Laren Somsen was
the only employee of the company thoroughly acquainted
with the facts of the accident and had a right to represent his company in the courtroom and his presence was
absolutely necessary for counsel to have available to them
63
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

information necessary to the defense of the action. Even
had the Appellants objected to his remaining in the courtroom, their objection would not have been well taken, and
no objection was made.
X. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL.
Appellants seem to base their argument for a new
trial on a conflict of the evidence as to whether certain
marks on the highway were ma~e by an automobile
driven by Horace Clark or by another Mercury automobile. In this regard they claim that they were surprised
by the evidence of I-Iorace Clark and that they did not
have an opportunity to call the witnesses Hal Noyes,
James F'aile, Roy Talbot and a Dr. Freeman. An examination of the testirnony of James Faile will indicate that
the Appellants' counsel knew of the conflict of evidence
which might arise in regard to the Mercury skid marks.
Statements taken by him from Noyes, Talbot and Faile
soon after the accident were not placed in the Record by
counsel for Appellants. The evidence indicates that
counsel had gone over this aspect of the case with the
witness James Faile et al in detail prior to the trial. He
had had the witness place certain marks on E~ibit ''P",
anticipating the very conflict which occurred (R. 789).
There is, therefore, no reason why Appellants should
have been surprised by this evidence.

Moreover, the Record indicates that the Appellants
had earlier examined each of the witnesses Noyes, Faile
and Talbot. Each of these witnesses had testified concerning the marks made by the Mercury automobile on
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direct Pxrunination and had been cross-examined by the
Appellants concerning the same (see pages 7-l--t-, 784, 803,
809 of the Record).
As to the claim that the witnesses F'aile, Noyes and
Talbot were excluded, or we presun1e otherwise unavailable, when defendant presented Clark's testimony, the
evidence shows that the witnesses Noyes and Talbot had
been previously excused by the court after the court had
asked counsel if there were any objections and no objections had been forthcoming (R. 758-810). The Record is
silent as to what happened to the witness Faile, but there
is no evidence that that witness was not immediately
available and certainly no evidence that counsel for the
defendant did anything to exclude or conceal these witnesses.
There is no showing in the Record that the Appellants requested any additional time to secure these witnesses. Nor is there any statement or offer of proof in
the Record as to what the witnesses would have testified
about. There is no evidence in the Record that Appellants so much as mentioned calling an additional witness, Dr. Freeman, or what that witness would have
testified about. He was not subpoenaed and could have
been if wan ted.
After an adverse verdict had been rendered, it is a
common practice for litigants to speculate on how the
outcome of a case might have been modified if evidence
which was not offered at the trial had been introduced.
'l'he law requires something more than that a party believes or represents there might have been evidence which
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was not presented. It requires some legal and justifiable
excuse for the evidence not to have been presented.
In this case, it appears that the Appellants had no reason
to be surprised at the evidence concerning the marks
made by the Mercury automobile. ~rhey did have an opportunity to e.xamine the witnesses Noyes, Faile and
Talbot in regard to those marks. They were not deprived
of their right of presenting any additional evidence which
would have been proper. The court was, therefore, correct in denying the motion to grant a new trial.
XI. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.

Appellants' argument is like the shot of a sawed-off
shotgun which is designed to spread rapidly and covers
a lot of ground. It is not specifically directed toward any
point, but attempts to raise a multitude of items in the
hope that they may hit upon something in which the court
might find error. In the preceding part of Appellants'
argument they argue that they should have a new trial
on the ground that the witness James Faile was not given
an opportunity to testify about the marks on the highway made by the Mercury automobile. In this part of
the Brief, they attempt to argue that upon the basis of
this witness's testimony concerning those marks they
were entitled to a directed verdict.
In this part of their Brief, as throughout the Brief,
they attempt to argue the facts of the case.
e have
covered the facts in the previous part of this Brief and
will briefly touch upon them later. At this point we prefer to limit the argument to the legal principals invohed.

"r
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The rule that a party to an action may not refresh
the memory or even cross-examine his own witness is not
without exception. Section 618, 58 Am. J ur. 342, cited
by the Appellants in their Brief, provides:
"A party ordinarily cannot cross-examine his
own witnesses. The purpose of cross-examination
is to test the truthfulness of the testimony given
by witnesses of the adverse party and to develop
and explain their testin1ony as developed in their
direct examination. With respect to one's own witness, it is only when he is hostile or testifies adversely that cross-examination is permitted. In
the latter case, however, it is recognized that the
witness 1nay be cross-sxamined, and leading questions may be put to him by the party calling him,
for the very sensible and sufficient reason that
he is adverse and that the danger arising from
such a mode of examination by the party calling
a friendly or unbiased witness does not exist. The
right to cross-examine in such a case, however, is
not absolute, but rests in the discretion of the trial
judge. Under the rule, a prosecuting attorney
may be allowed to cross-examine his own witness
where the latter had materially weakened the
effect of important testinwny given by hin1 on a
previous trial."
Section 799, 58 Am. J ur. 444 provides :
"A recognized exception to the rule that a witness may not be impeached by the party at whose
instance he testifies exists in the case of a witness
who is hostile or unwilling, or who by his testimony surprises the party calling him, provided
the surprise is substantial. Well-recognized reasons and principles of the law of evidence support the proposition that, at least in the discretion
of the trial court, a party surprised by the ad67
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verse testimony of his own witness may show that
the witness had made prior statements inconsistent with, or contradictory of, the testimony which
he gave. It would be grossly unfair to permit a
witness to entrap a party into calling him by making a statement, (especially an isolated conclusion) favorable to that party's contention, and
then, when he is called and accredited hy that
party and gives testimony at variance with his
previous statement and against that party's interest, to deny the party calling him the right to
show that he was induced to do so by a previous
statement of the witness made under such circumstances as to warrant a reasonable belief that the
witness would repeat the statement when called
to testify. But the court should be satisfied that
the party has been taken by surprise, and that the
testimony is contrary to what he had just cause to
expect from the witness based upon his statements. Moreover, the staternents must be contradictory of the witness' testirnony."
See also Morton v. Hood, 105 Utah 484, 143 Pac.
(2d) 434.
An e.xamination of the Record will show that on direct examination, and as heretofore quoted from the
Record, the witness Faile testified concerning the l\fercury marks in a manner favorable to the defendants consistent with the other witnesses. (R. 779-784) On crossexamination, the witness while necessarily acknowledging signing the affidavits tried to explain, but was cut
off by counsel for respondents (R. 784-791). On redirect
examination, counsel for the defendant merely sought
to show that statements the witness had made prior to
the trial indicated, that he would testify as had been in-
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dicated by his direct exan1ination and that his testinwny
on cross-exrunination came as a surprise. There can be
no question but that the defendailt was surprised, otherwise defendants would not have called him as a witness
and that the redirect examination of the witness clearly
fell within the s~ception to the rule that a party cailno't
cross-examine or impeach his own witness.
A reading of the witness F'ailes' testimony (R. 779805) will reveal that the testimony of this witness was
not as favorable to appellant as it is asserted to be in the
appellant's brief. The marks which appellant claims were
made by the iliercury, rather than gtudebaker, extended into the debris of the collision. On direct examination
this witness was asked :
"Q. Did the Mercury get into the debris at
all before it came to a stop?"
"A.

I don't think it did." (R. 784)

On cross-examination he admitted that he had observed plaintiff's Exhibit PP in plaintiff's counsel's office
and initialed certain marks contained therein, as the
marks made by the Mercury automobile. On redirect
exan1ination, he testified that he had been up to counsel
for the plaintiff's office about two or three weeks prior
to the trial and had made the marks on Exhibit PP (R.
793). On redirect examination, he reiterated his prior
testimony on direct examination, as given in the court
reporter's statement. It was for the jury to weigh his
testimony, However, in determining the question of
whether or not the court should have granted plaintiff's
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1notion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we
should keep in mind that his testimony that the marks
which appellant claims were made by the :Mercury rather
than the Studebaker were not made by the Mercury,
was corroborated by three other independent witnesses,
Hal Noyes, Roy Talbot and Horace Clark and the affidavits concealed by counsel for respondent were used
as impeaching rather than direct evidence. It is, therefore, subn1itted that there was not sufficient evidence
upon which the court could have set aside the verdict and
entered judgment in the plaintiff's favor.
XII. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO CROSS EXAMINE THE WITNESS CULBERT
ROBINSON AND HAL NOYES.

The record does not bear out appellant's contention
that he was not permitted to cross-examine either of the
witnesses Culbert Robinson or the witness Hal Noyes. His
cross-examination of Culbert Robinson will be found in
the Record on Pages 610-618. Appellant's recross-examination of Culbert Robinson will be found in the Record
on page 620. His cross-examination of the witness Hal
Noyes will be found on pages 744 to 758 of the Record.
While appellants claim that they were not given
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness Culbert
Robinson, the only specific parts of the testimony they
refer to is a ruling on the propriety of asking the Sheriff
whether or not there was a law in the Stat<> of 1Ttah whi<'h
requires brakes to be adjusted equally on each side so
that they will lay down equal tract~ on each side, ( R.
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611-lS R. 617 -6) which is not the first time counsel for
respondent has reargued this point.

Upon objection from the defendant's counsel, the
Sheriff was not pennitted to answer either of the questions upon the grounds that the questions called for a
conclusion of the law and that it was the court's function
rather than the witnesses to instruct the jury as to what
law was.
On page 756 of the Record, counsel attempted to go
into the location of certain marks on the Studebaker
automobile. There had been no testimony on direct examination concerning any of such marks on the Studebaker or otherwise. The objection to the question was
sustained on the theory that it went beyond the scope of
direct examination. Again on Page 756 counsel for the
defendant asked Mr. Noyes:

"Q. Mr. Noyes, did you or did you not convince yourself that things had occurred at that
accident that you did not observe f'
The question was objected to on the grounds that it
was speculative. The court ruled:
"The Court. The objection is sustained. He
may tell this jury what he saw or what he knows
about it."

It, therefore, appears that counsel for the appellant
was not precluded from cross-examining the witness
Culbert Robinson and Hal Noyes, but was merely precluded in the instances cited by him from asking an improper question.
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SUMMARY
In this case the jury, after four days of trial on the
question of liability, by their answers to the special interrogatories absolved the defendant from any blame for
the accident out of which this action arises.
A reading of the voluminous record in the case evidences the fact that plaintiffs were given every opportunity to present their evidence to the court and indeed
availed themselves of that opportunity to the extent of
three-fourths of the entire time taken up by the trial
in the presentation of their evidence. The accident involved two vehicles approaching each other on a highway approximately 24 feet in width, each driving in
opposite directions. There was only one basis of negligence which could have been the ultimate cause of the
accident, and certainly this was determined and acknowledged at the pre-trial, namely that one or the other
of the two vehicles was driven onto the wrong side of
the highway prior to the impact. The ultimate issue as
determined at the pre-trial was also evident in the manner in which each side presented their evidence. Plaintiffs'
theory was clearly to sh~w that the impact occurred wen
on plaintiffs' side of the road and they similarly disclaimed that any impact could have occurred as claimed
by defendant.
Considerable has been said by Appellants to the effect that the brakes on defendant's vehicle were improperly adjusted and maintained in such a manner a~
to cause the vehicle to veer to the left upon an appJica72
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tion of the brakes. Plaintiffs were permitted to present
this theory in great detail and to exmnine their experts
sxtensively. In the last analysis, however, the testimony
was merely evidence of the ultiinate issue as to which
driver drove onto the wrong side of the highway. Appellants assert the trial judge was prejudiced against them
and he committed errors in the conduct of the trial. Actually a reading of all the testimony at the time of the
trial will dislose that the trial court, if anything, leaned
over backwards in the paintiffs' favor in allowing them
to get all of their evidence before the jury. Only in those
cases where the infraction of the rules were too flagrant
to be overlooked did the court sustain an objection to
any of the questions or preclude the admission of any
evidence. Counsel for Appellants repeatedly asked leading and suggestive questions and demonstrated the accident before the jury while examining their witnesses.
Even cellophane overlays, prepared prior to trial, were
used to direct the witnesses. These were ingeniously
marked in color with distances to portray exactly how
counsel claimed the accident occurred. The court patiently permitted plaintiffs to present all of such evidence and in the end fairly submitted the issue to the
jury. The jury unanimously and unmistakably found that
the Studebaker was negligently driven across the highway just before the impact and that defendant's truck
was not. Certai~ly the jury was justified, and we believe
most certainly correct, in not permitting the accident to
he re-constructed and in finding a verdict which was
hased upon the clear preponderance of the evidence anq
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the testimony of dis-interested eye witnesses corroborated by the marks and measurements as explained by
the investigating officers.
A reading of the Record further shows that plaintiffs
relied essentially upon conjecture and supposition. Counsel for Appellants based his theory upon the assumption
that certain marks on the highway were made by certain
tires on the defendant's vehicle and that those tires would
have reacted in a certain way upon an impact between the
two vehicles. If the jury chose not to believe any one of
these suppositions or assumptions, plaintiffs' entire case
must fall. One of many unreasonable assumptions was
the assumption that Laren Somsen, driver of defendant's
vehicle, which was rounding a gradual curve well on its
own side at 37 miles per hour, would have any occasion to
apply the brakes of the tractor in the manner in which
they were applied or turn from his course unless some
emergency situation presented itself to the driver. That
emergency was the sudden entry of the Studebaker automobile over into his lane of traffic.
Counsel for Appellants, under his theory, expected
the jury to entirely disregard the other evidence in the
case and the eye witnesses and rely solely upon the vaguP
testimony of Bowman et al and the opinion testimony of
experts. The danger of placing too much emphasis on
this type of evidence is apparent. In an automobile aceident there are so many factors of such variable nature
which must be taken into consideration that no expert, no
matter how skilled, could arrive at a conclusion which
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would not be subject to question. This principal has
been recognized by some jurisdictions to the extent that
an opinion of an sxpert as to the ultimate cause of an
accident has been held to be inadn1issable and, in any
event, strictly limited.
"* * * Smne of the courts lay down the rule
that, in such case, to permit an expert to state even
an answer to a hypothetical question, what was
the cause of the accident would be to invade the
jury's domain and, therefore, that such an opinion
is inadmissible." 20 Am. Jur. 688.
In the case of Fishman v. Silva (Cal.), 2 Pac. (2d)
473, with reference to the use of opinion and expert
testimony in automobile cases, said the court:
"* * * It is needless to add, as in all such
cases, there is presented a wide field for argument,
the main theme of which is physical facts and the
so-called i1nmutable laws of physics. Contentions
based on these foundations are usually not convincing, strange as it may seem, for the simple
reason that in partisan presentation there is an
ever present temptation to forget essential facts
which do not fit in. For instance, where it is argued that, where there is a contact of two bodies
in a given position, the direction of the applied
force will control the position of the bodies after
the impact, any rule or law, in the abstract, will be
found of little value when we have the additional
factors of each body in motion and controlled by
independent agencies. Experience has shown the
futility of attempted demonstration in accident
cases ; there are too many varying factors. Among
these variants we may class indefinite rate of
speed, condition of the highway, judgment or lack
thereof in the drivers, a direct blow or a glancing
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one, and the balance or equilibriun1 of each car
at the time of impact. * * *"
In Johnston v. Peairs, (Cal.), 3 Pac. (2d) 617 several
experts were produced to show that when two cars came
into collision under the circumstances shown by the eYidence one of them would necessarily be up-set and that
it would be physically and mechanically impossible for
the one car to travel the 45 feet it did travel after the
collision to strike plaintiff. Error was assigned on appeal for the failure of the lower court to admit in evidence the opinion testimony:
"The refusal of the court to admit such te8timony is assigned as error. It is appellant's contention that expert testimony was admissible to
prove that these cars could not, if struck in the
manner and under the circumstances testified to
by plaintiff's witnesses, have moved or come to
rest in the manner also testified to. Such a eontention is well answered in the case of Fishman Y.
Silva (Cal. App.) 2 P. (2d) 473,474. * * *"
The court then went on to quote the language in the
Silva case above mentioned and held that it was not error
to exclude such expert opinions.
In Moniz v. Bettencourt (Cal.), 76 Pac. (2d) 535, in
holding sxpert opinion testimony was properly excluded,
the court added :
"Courts look with disfavor upon thi~ type of
testimony upon the ground that it i~ impossible
to establish all of tlie neee:-;~ary elemenb sneh a~
the reaction of the human mi1~d under a e<>rtain
set of circumstances; the impossibility of having
complete knowledge of the exac·t Rpeed, course of
the wind, if any, and for('e of the impact. • • *'"
/()
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I

I

Notwithstanding the questionable nature of plaintiffs' opinion expert testimony, plaintiffs were allowed
great leeway in examining their expert witnesses as well
as their lay witnesses. If such evidence could have been
sufficient to establish an accident on the east side of the
highway, certainly the expert testimony produced by defendant through Srun Taylor equally showed that the impact could have been on defendant's right hand side.
~lore important than any of the expert testilnony,
however, were the actual eye witnesses to the accident
and the physical evidence on the highway. The independent witnesses Hal ~oyes, James Faile and Roy Talbot
were following defendant's vehicle down the highway
and two of them, namely Noyes and Faile, saw the impact
as it occurred three or four feet from the edge of defendant's shoulder. This testimony was corroborated by the
unmistakable physical evidence examined by the investigating officers the morning the accident occurred.
It must be remembered that defendant's driver had
only an appro.x;imate second's warning when the Studebaker swung across the highway into a crab-like rnotion,
traveling at a terrific speed about 80 miles per hour.
rrhis, with the combined speed of defendant's tractor (37
miles per hour), made a resulting combined force of approximately 117 miles per hour, resulting in the explosive forces. There was no time for planned or deliberate
action on the part of defendant's driver. He said he may
have instinctively started to turn to the left to avoid the
impact and the eye witnesses thought that he had started
to ~w turn. The impact, coming in against the right front
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l
of defendant's tractor, bent and pushed back the right
front corner and wheel, locking the wheel and flattening
the right front tire. It also flattened the left front tire
of the Studebaker. Apparently a scissor-like action followed, which accounts for the marks on the side of the
Studebaker and the damage and marks on the side of defendant's rig, all of which were described and accounted
for by Sam Taylor who carefully examined both vehicles.
It also accounts for the tire n1arks of the Studebaker
which were traceable by the officers from the area of the
impact across the shoulder and to the point where the
Studebaker came to rest. Tracing back from the scene of
the accident, the Studebaker tire marks, as testified to by
the officers, were clearly traceable from where it first
entered the curve, getting onto its right shoulder and
then swerving out of control to the point of impact and
thus to where it came to rest.
At some point after the collision the crescent was
evidently gouged by the rim of the left front wheel of
the Studebaker.
Exhibit "B" clearly shows the wavey marks caused
from the flattened tire of the defendant's right front
wheel. The investigating officers testified how this flat
tire mark was easily traced on through to the right front
wheel. This type of 1nark certainly was suggestive of
plaintiffs' theory that there were zig zag marks. Plaintiffs' witnesses denied that there were any marks from
the flattened tire as shown in Exhibit "B".
Had the impact occurred where claimed by counsel
for Appellants, it is extremely doubtful that defendant':-:
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driver, Laren Son1sen, could have 8topped where he did
almost instantaneously with the alleged impaet on the
east side.
It would be hard to believe that the vague tire marks
claimed to ha Ye been observed by Bowman et al the day
after the accident were n1ade by the Studebaker or even
related to the accident. Such evidence was certainly
questionable especially when no e;xamination was made
by any of the plaintiffs' witnesses the day the accident
occurred and only after there had been considerable traffic. The investigating officers said there were no such
marks.
Nor was the claim as to the Mercury marks sufficient to require the jury to disregard the testimony of
the eye witnesses and the investigating officers. There
was ample and convincing evidence that when the Mercury stopped it came nowhere near the debris. Counsel's
suggestion that there may have been two Mercurys is
pure speculation and in any event there is no direct evidence that the marks examined by the officers were
caused by a Mercury.
In the trial of the case the court, out of liberality to
plaintiffs, left the issue for the jury. The jury returned
clear and unqualified answers in favor of defendant and
their verdict was based on the testimony of disinterested
eye witnesses corroborated by the clear physical facts as
witnessed by the investigating officers and others present immediately following the accident.
Appellants, in assigning everything imaginable as
error, have failed in many instances to refer to any of
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the Record and in other instances they have made bold
assertions and conclusions not justified by the Record.
A review of the proceedings shows that the court fairly
and impartially tried the case and that there was no
prejudicial error committed during the course of the trial.
Respectfully submitted,

STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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